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THE NOT SO FRIENDLY SKIES: PILOTS’ ATTEMPT TO
CLAIM EMPLOYER COLLUSION WITH RIVAL PILOTS
UNION DURING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
FAILS IN BECKINGTON
DREW BAKER*
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT (RLA)1 allows airline employeesto unionize and unions to act on the employees’ behalf dur-
ing collective bargaining.2 During negotiations, the unions have
a duty of fair representation (DFR) to every employee they re-
present.3 If a union breaches this duty, its members have a “judi-
cially implied” cause of action against the union.4 However,
courts vary in how far they are willing to imply other causes of
action under the RLA.5 In Beckington v. American Airlines, Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit reviewed a request to imply a cause of action
against employers for collusion with a competing union during
negotiations.6 The court “decline[d] the invitation,”7 creating a
possible split with the Seventh Circuit.8 This Casenote argues
that the Ninth Circuit’s reluctance to read employer collusion
liability into the RLA was correct for three reasons: (1) the Sev-
enth Circuit’s reasoning is shaky at best; (2) in the years since,
no court has found employer–union collusion or been able to
articulate a legal test for finding such collusion; and (3) the im-
pact of possible employer collusion on the airline industry
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2021; B.S., University of
Utah, 2018. I would like to thank Professor Grant Hayden for his comments,
everyone in the SMU Law Review Association who worked on this Casenote, and
my friends and family for their continuing encouragement and support.
1 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2018).
2 Beckington v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 926 F.3d 595, 597 (9th Cir. 2019).
3 Id. at 597–98.
4 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979).
5 Compare Beckington, 926 F.3d at 598, with United Indep. Flight Officers, Inc. v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.2d 1274, 1283 (7th Cir. 1985).
6 Beckington, 926 F.3d at 604.
7 Id.
8 See United Indep. Flight Officers, 756 F.2d at 1283.
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would be burdensome at best, ruinous at worst, and contrary to
Congress’s intent for enacting the RLA.
The RLA was enacted in 1926 to ensure the economy would
not be further interrupted by the strikes that had plagued rail-
roads for decades.9 Ten years later, the RLA was amended to
include the burgeoning airline industry.10 To prevent strikes,
the RLA requires that airlines and employees “exert every rea-
sonable effort to make and maintain” collective bargaining
agreements and to settle all disputes “with all expedition.”11 Fur-
ther, before either party takes action against the other, they
must negotiate, attend mediation with the National Mediation
Board, face possible review by the Presidential Emergency
Board, and finally, submit to mandatory cooling-off periods.12
Because of these complex provisions, it is rare to see a strike
affect U.S. airlines—before 2019, the last was in 2010.13
The dispute in Beckington centers on “a bitter seniority” battle
between two competing pilots unions.14 In 2005, US Airways
merged with America West Airlines, and the merged airline
(that kept US Airways’ name) needed to determine the seniority
of its merged employees.15 US Airways left the negotiation of the
pilots’ seniority to the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), which
represented the pilots for both airlines pre-merger.16 However,
shortly after takeoff, the pilots found themselves soaring
through unforeseen turbulence. Unable to settle on a seniority
list of their own, ALPA arranged for arbitration between the two
sets of pilots.17 The resulting seniority list—known as the Nico-
lau Award—appeared more advantageous for the America West
pilots.18 Before the merger, US Airways employed a greater
9 U.S. FED. R.R. ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT (“RLA”), AND
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S (“DOT”) ROLE IN RLA DISPUTES I
(2012); see also The Great Railroad Strike, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1877 (“There are
indications that the rebellion, if such we may call it, will affect most of the lines of
railroad travel between the East and the West, and will seriously impede the
movement of freight”).
10 See 45 U.S.C. § 181 (2018).
11 Id. § 152, First–Second.
12 See generally id. §§ 152–60.
13 See Alison Sider & Doug Cameron, Labor Troubles Cloud Outlook for U.S. Air-
lines, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/labor-troubles-
cloud-outlook-for-u-s-airlines-11563454033 [https://perma.cc/5MRC-WHHF].
14 Beckington v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 926 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 2019).
15 See id. at 600–01.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 601.
18 See id.
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number of pilots, and unhappy with the Nicolau Award, the for-
mer US Airways pilots used their numbers to leave ALPA, create
a new union known as the US Airline Pilots Association
(USAPA), and vote in USAPA as the official union of the
merged US Airways pilots.19 Moving forward in negotiations with
US Airways, USAPA ignored the Nicolau Award and pushed for
terms that favored the former US Airways pilots.20
The America West pilots eventually sued USAPA, claiming
that it breached its DFR under the RLA because it ignored the
Nicolau Award in its negotiations with US Airways.21 The district
court found for the America West pilots, but the Ninth Circuit
vacated the judgment, holding that the claim would not be ripe
until there was a single agreement with the airline for determin-
ing seniority.22 Afterward, US Airways filed for a declaratory
judgment asking if it would “be liable for assisting in a breach”
of USAPA’s DFR if it entered into an agreement that did not
include the Nicolau Award provisions.23 The district court did
not advise US Airways because the claim was not ripe; but the
court noted that USAPA’s actions had it nearing a no-fly zone
because it was bound by the earlier agreement that led to the
Nicolau Award, and it should be attempting to negotiate with
US Airways based on the award.24 Some years later, with two se-
niority lists still in place, US Airways began planning a merger
with American Airlines (American).25 Before merging, the air-
lines, USAPA, and the union for American’s pilots agreed to
reach a single seniority list, and if negotiations failed, to un-
dergo arbitration under the McCaskill-Bond Amendment.26 Ne-
gotiations failed and the groups entered arbitration with the
appointed panel.27 In 2016, the panel issued a decision and
methodology for integrating seniority lists that did not include




22 Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n (Addington I), 606 F.3d 1174, 1179–82
(9th Cir. 2010).
23 Beckington, 926 F.3d at 601; see US Airways, Inc. v. Addington (Addington II),
No. CV-10-01570-PHX-ROS, 2012 WL 5996936, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 11, 2012).
24 Addington II, 2012 WL 5996936, at *4–5.
25 Beckington, 926 F.3d at 601.
26 Id. at 602; see 49 U.S.C. § 42112 note (2018) (Labor Integration) (setting out
the duties of airlines regarding labor when merging).
27 Beckington, 926 F.3d at 603.
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had “changed . . . dramatically” and, during litigation, courts
“have uniformly declined to impose” the award.28
Finally, in 2017, the current lawsuit took flight when former
America West pilots claimed American colluded with USAPA
during the failed negotiations that led to arbitration.29 Relying
on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United Independent Flight Of-
ficers, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc.,30 the district court “appeared
to accept” that an airline could be liable for colluding with a
union under the RLA.31 However, the district court granted
American’s motion to dismiss based on the former pilots’ failure
to properly allege “collusion.”32 The America West pilots ap-
pealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the RLA
does not support a liability claim against an employer for collud-
ing with a union during negotiations.33
The Ninth Circuit stated that nothing in the RLA “supports
an expansion . . . to impose liability on an employer solely for its
‘collusion’ in a union’s breach of duty.”34 While airlines owe
their employees some duties under the RLA, nothing in the stat-
ute contemplates imposing liability on an employer for collud-
ing with a union when the union breaches its DFR.35 Indeed, the
RLA’s process for collective bargaining puts the employer on
one side of the table and the employees’ union on the other;
the two sides must “approach each other as respectful adversa-
ries,” each with duties to their respective constituents.36 The
court noted that because the RLA does not contain the word
“collusion,” the pilots must have used the term colloquially.37 In
the context of finding liability, collusion is “a synonym for ‘con-
spiracy,’” which is when multiple parties make an agreement to
violate a duty they owe to another party.38 This conclusion, cou-
pled with the notion that each party represents separate entities
during negotiations (the airline to its investors, and the union to
28 Id.
29 See id.
30 756 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1985).
31 Beckington, 926 F.3d at 603–04.
32 Beckington v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CV-17-00328-PHX-JJT, 2018 WL
1400074, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2018), aff’d, 926 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2019).
33 Beckington, 926 F.3d at 609–10.
34 Id. at 604.
35 Id.; see also 45 U.S.C. § 152 First, Third, Fourth (2018) (various duties im-
posed on airlines).
36 Beckington, 926 F.3d at 605.
37 Id. at 606.
38 Id.
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its members), led the court to hold that an employer cannot
collude during collective bargaining because “an employer owes
no duty to individual employees during collective bargaining.”39
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit in United Inde-
pendent Flight Officers implied that an employer could be liable
for collusion even though no statutory provision or court prece-
dent supported such a finding.40 In United Independent Flight Of-
ficers, the pilots union was suing United Airlines for terms set
forth in pilot benefit plans and the negotiations that sur-
rounded the creation of the plans.41 Typically, when employees
sue both their union and their employer in a hybrid action
under the RLA, they sue their employer for breach of con-
tract—for violating a preexisting employment agreement—and
also their union for breaching its DFR.42 Hybrid actions have
been recognized under Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act43 since the Supreme Court held that it covers
breach of contract claims between employees and employers.44
While Section 301 does not apply to RLA employers, the Su-
preme Court has also allowed hybrid actions under the RLA if
employees sue their union and their employer when the dispute
“resulted from a breach of the DFR by the union.”45
However, in United Independent Flight Officers, the employees
sued their union for its DFR breach and merely included their
employer for being a party to the union’s breach.46 As such,
United Independent Flight Officers was not the typical hybrid action
allowed under the RLA or Section 301. The Seventh Circuit ac-
knowledged that United Independent Flight Officers was not a typi-
cal hybrid action by the employees.47 After so recognizing, the
39 Id.
40 United Indep. Flight Officers, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.2d 1274,
1283 (7th Cir. 1985).
41 Id. at 1275.
42 See John E. Sanchez, Jury Trials in Hybrid and Non-Hybrid Actions: The Equitable
Clean-Up Doctrine in the Guise of Inseparability and Other Analytical Problems, 38
DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 629–34 (1989) (discussing hybrid actions under the RLA
and the NLRB).
43 Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 136,
156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2018)) (creating a cause of action
between unions and employers).
44 Sanchez, supra note 42, at 636; see also Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S.
195, 201 (1962).
45 Sanchez, supra note 42, at 636–37.
46 United Indep. Flight Officers, 756 F.2d at 1275–76.
47 Id. at 1283 (“UIFO does not bring a direct claim against United . . . as is
usually the case in what have come to be known as ‘[hybrid] DFR/301’ cases”).
172 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
court should not have even considered the employees’ collusion
claim against their employer.48 The Seventh Circuit’s tenuous
conclusion is made even weaker because it held the union had
not breached its DFR to the employees.49 The court further
noted the “conceptual anomaly that would arise” if the em-
ployer was found liable when the union was not.50 Despite this
assertion, the court went on to opine that when negotiations oc-
cur between an employer and a union that does not necessarily
imply collusion; however, it also does not preclude a finding of
collusion merely because a negotiation was taking place.51
The confusion caused by United Independent Flight Officers is ap-
parent when reviewing decisions from courts that try to rely on
its reasoning and continually fail to articulate a workable legal
test for finding employer–union collusion. Some decisions fol-
lowing United Independent Flight Officers accept that employers
may be held liable for collusion outside the typical hybrid action
but have failed to then find employer misconduct that rose to
the level of collusion.52 One such case, from a district court in
the Ninth Circuit, relied on another case involving United Air-
lines to note that when dealing generally with one party being
liable for another’s breach of duty, “conduct that rises to the
level of ‘collusion’ almost certainly suffices.”53 However, the em-
ployer was not found liable for collusion because the employees
only proved that the employer knew certain facts about the
union’s activities that might show the employer had knowledge
the union was breaching its DFR.54 Apparently, the district court
did not feel that such knowledge rose to the level of collusion.
Other courts considering hybrid actions note that employers
may only be liable for collusion when the union has been found
48 Beckington v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 926 F.3d 595, 609 (9th Cir. 2019).
49 See United Indep. Flight Officers, 756 F.2d at 1283.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 361–62 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); Krakowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc. (In re AMR Corp.), No. 11-15463
(SHL), 2018 WL 2997104, at *26–28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018), aff’d, 610
B.R. 434, 448–49 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2019); Am. Airlines Flow-Thru Pilots Coal. v.
Allied Pilots Ass’n, No. 15-cv-03125-RS, 2015 WL 9204282, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
17, 2015).
53 Am. Airlines Flow-Thru Pilots Coal., 2015 WL 9204282, at *3 (citing Rakestraw
v. United Airlines, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
981 F.2d 1524 (7th Cir. 1992)).
54 Id.
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guilty of breaching its DFR.55 These courts cite United Indepen-
dent Flight Officers for the premise that to find an employer liable
for collusion “it is essential that the union be found to have vio-
lated its duty.”56 This Casenote posits that because the decisions
considering United Independent Flight Officers have been unable to
coalesce around a single principle, the Seventh Circuit’s reason-
ing is not as strong as the Ninth Circuit’s in Beckington. The
Ninth Circuit refused to write employer liability into the RLA’s
statutory text.57 This is the proper conclusion; if Congress finds
that employer collusion becomes an increasingly concerning
problem, it can amend the RLA to include such a prohibition.
Even though courts have repeatedly relied on the premise of
United Independent Flight Officers, none have articulated a legal
test for finding actions that rise to the level of collusion.58 One
court considered two standards simultaneously: “employer[s]
somehow act[ing] improperly,” and the employer merely having
knowledge that the union had breached its DFR to the employ-
ees.59 In comparison, when the district court in Beckington found
that the former America West pilots failed to allege collusion, it
used a standard defined as “bad faith, discrimination or hostil-
ity.”60 In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted other proposed
standards for employer collusion and was not convinced that
any of them were sufficient without a statutory definition of col-
lusion.61 The Ninth Circuit’s consideration of this aspect further
strengthens the argument it presents in Beckington; rather than
adding to the confusion without offering a workable solution,
the Ninth Circuit correctly reasoned that it could not “transform
a theory of union liability into a theory of employer liability” in
accordance with the RLA.62
The discussion above shows the soundness of the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s legal argument in Beckington, but the outcome may be
even more important because it has real-world effects on one of
the largest industries in the country. The most recent report by
the FAA estimates that the airline industry accounts for 5.1% of
55 See, e.g., Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, No. C-98-359 MMC, 1998 WL
474076, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1998); Caudle v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
676 F. Supp. 314, 323 (D.D.C. 1987).
56 Bishop, 1998 WL 474076, at *18; see also Caudle, 676 F. Supp. at 323.
57 Beckington v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 926 F.3d 595, 605 (9th Cir. 2019).
58 Id. at 609.
59 Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
60 Beckington, 926 F.3d at 604.
61 Id. at 609.
62 Id.
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United States GDP, generates $1.6 trillion per year, and employs
10.6 million Americans.63 The Beckington decision is vital to this
booming industry because it is one of the most unionized in the
country; as of 2018, three of the big four carriers’ employees
were over 70% unionized.64 Delta, with only 18% unionization
(pilots represented by ALPA),65 has experienced a fair share of
criticism for its recent attempt to dissuade its flight attendant
and ramp service personnel from also unionizing.66 With such a
large percentage of unionized employees and the long history of
the RLA, the author feels confident that both airlines and the
unions who negotiate with them are familiar with the “industry’s
complex labor laws.”67 Collective bargaining under these laws is
already an “elaborate, time-consuming process.”68 If the Beck-
ington court had accepted the former America West pilots’ con-
tention that American could be liable for collusion, the process
would become even more time-consuming and elaborate be-
cause airlines would act even more cautiously to protect them-
selves from liability. This outcome would not only directly cost
the airlines financially,69 it would cost them the goodwill they
have accumulated in recent years. In a time when the public has
witnessed the chaos caused by the strike of British Airways’ pi-
lots,70 experienced the inconvenience of Boeing’s 737 MAX
groundings,71 and because all four major U.S. carriers are get-
63 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CIVIL AVIATION ON THE U.S.
ECONOMY: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CIVIL AVIATION BY STATE, at 3 (2017) (citing data
from 2014).
64 Ted Reed, JetBlue, United and Delta Face Union Pressure as Airlines Remain a
Labor Stronghold, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedreed/
2018/02/02/jetblue-united-and-delta-face-union-pressure-as-airlines-remain-a-la-
bor-stronghold/#3c787a8cfda7 [https://perma.cc/F8HG-62F8]; see also THE
GLOBAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 277–78 (Peter Belobaba et al. eds., 2009).
65 THE GLOBAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY, supra note 64, at 279 tbl.10.1; Reed, supra
note 64.
66 Christine Hauser, Video Games and Drinks, or Union Dues? Delta’s Pitch Draws
Fire, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/busi-
ness/delta-union-video-games.html [https://perma.cc/NZ5Z-EXJH].
67 See Sider & Cameron, supra note 13.
68 U.S. FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 9, at I.
69 See Sider & Cameron, supra note 13 (even a few workers’ actions are “hugely
disruptive.”).
70 Tariro Mzezewa, What the British Airways Pilot Strike Means for Travelers, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/travel/british-air
ways-pilot-strike.html [https://perma.cc/A3EU-BHG2].
71 David Gelles, Boeing 737 Max Needs Full F.A.A. Review, Crash Families Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/business/boeing-
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ting ready to enter collective bargaining with the pilots unions,72
airlines can hardly afford any more negative press or financial
stress. Given these considerations, the Beckington decision can be
seen as beneficial to the airline industry even outside its legal
context.
In conclusion, because the RLA was enacted to ensure the
country’s economy would no longer be hindered by numerous
and drawn-out strikes in the rail and airline industries, the
Ninth Circuit’s reluctance to impose employer liability for collu-
sion is correct and should be followed by other courts. By hold-
ing that an airline cannot be liable for conduct under the RLA
absent a correctly filed hybrid action against both the airline
and the union, the Beckington court correctly interpreted the
RLA as currently written, ensuring that airlines can continue
providing the services Congress was so eager to protect when
originally enacting the RLA.
737-max-faa-recertification-stumo.html?searchResultPosition=10 [https://
perma.cc/LZ3E-4RHS].
72 Sider & Cameron, supra note 13.
